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THE ROLE OF COMPLETION BONDING
COMPANIES IN INDEPENDENT
PRODUCTIONS
Mark C. Phillipst
INTRODUCTION
Independent movie producers ("independents") breathe new life
into Hollywood by offering a creative alternative to traditional major stu-
dios. That creativity, however, is being threatened from an unexpected
direction - the bonding companies that guarantee a movie's timely com-
pletion. Everyone involved in movie production should become familiar
with how these "film guarantors" work, because guarantors wield enor-
mous power and influence on the set. This understanding is especially
significant for the independent because the arrangement whereby a guar-
antor supervises the creation of a movie often wrests production control
away from the independent. Such an arrangement is required by the in-
dependent's backers - banks' and major studios/distributors ("ma-
jors")2 that invest in production - who want their losses covered if the
independent fails to complete a movie on time and under budget.
If a film guarantor's role ended when it paid out claims, it would be
like that of other guarantors, such as those in the construction industry.
However, a film guarantor has more pervasive powers than do other
guarantors, including the right to intervene if a project falls apart or goes
over budget. While the more common recourse in the event of produc-
tion breakdown is renegotiation with the independent's backers, the
guarantor has a contractual right to eject the independent and take over
t Associate, Hagenbaugh & Murphy, Glendale, California. St. John's College (B.A.
1980), Dominican School of Philosophy (M.A. 1983), California Western School of Law (J.D.
1990). The author acknowledges the editorial assistance of Craig D. Aronson, Esq., Partner,
Hagenbaugh & Murphy, and the high concept from Arthur W. Campbell, Esq., Entertainment
Law Professor, California Western School of Law. © by Mark C. Phillips 1991.
1. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
2. A major studio ("major") can contract to distribute an independent's film and lend its
name to the release. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. The majors, in alphabeti-
cal order, include Columbia, Disney, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount, Twentieth Century
Fox, United Artists, Universal/MCA, and Warner Brothers. Smaller studios are labeled "mi-
nors" to distinguish them from both the majors and independents. WILLIAM GREFf, FILM
FINANCING: THE ART OF RAISING MONEY FOR MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION 1 (1975);
Hilary De Vries, Rider on the Storm, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, (Magazine), at 8, 9.
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production if the guarantor - not the independent - thinks it is neces-
sary to save the film. This scenario typifies the perennial tension between
independents and guarantors: one seeks artistic freedom, while the other
attempts to keep that freedom within the bounds of fiscal propriety.
Many independents are uncertain as to how to deal with guarantors.
Independents typically demand unfettered "creative vision and control"
over the whole production.3 Even independents who take their indepen-
dence literally, like Randy Turrow, are not immune to the authority of
guarantors. In February, 1991, Mr. Turrow was caught in a quandary:
Should he listen to his guarantor, who ordered him to stop shooting, or
to his director, who wanted to continue shooting? He was overheard
arguing with his director in a restaurant parking lot: "You knew what
the situation was. You said you could shoot it in 30 days. You're four
days over schedule and over budget. The bonding company wanted me
to stop shooting yesterday. I had to beg for one more day [emphasis
added]." 4
Another independent concerned about guarantors is superstar Syl-
vester Stallone. He had a multi-project deal with Carolco Pictures to star
in five films and produce five others. That deal has been renegotiated, in
part because of Stallone's perception of guarantors as an impediment to
his creativity. He explains why he will now appear only in four films and
not produce at all: "I'm not enamored of the business behind the cam-
era, the catering, the bonding companies. It kills the aesthetic."5
There is a very real danger that an independent will lose production
control to a guarantor. One industry observer commented in August,
1990, .that four pictures then in production were over budget and ru-
mored to be "blowing up. '"6 Three particularly large claims in the 1980s
were Yentfl (which went $1 million over budgets); Porky's9 (the guaran-
tor, Film Finances, recouped its payments when the film became a box
3. Jack Matthews, Good Show for Independent Film Makers, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1989,
(Calendar), at 23. Mr. Joe Roth, a former independent and now studio chief at Twentieth
Century Fox, describes the "independent's mentality" as "the belief that he can and should be
on top of all aspects of the craft." L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1991, (Calendar), at 80.
4. Paul Ciotti, Screenwriter in Wonderland, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1991, (Magazine), at 16.
5. Lawrence Christon, Can Sly Get Serious?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1990, (Calendar), at 8,
9.
6. Paul Noglows, Risk No Deterrent To New Breed Of Film Guarantors, DAILY VARIETY,
Aug. 10, 1990, at 29.
7. YENTL (United Artists 1983).
8. Ray Loynd, Risky Business." Film Bond Companies Will Guarantee That Your Film
Gets Finished Even If You Can't Do Same, DAILY VARIETY, June 17, 1985, at 115.
9. PORKY'S (Fox 1981).
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office hit"0 ); and The Adventures of Baron Munchausen " (Film Finances
was forced to spend $14 million to save the film, and the picture eventu-
ally cost twice its projected $23 million budget 2).
Just as the number of independent films has increased since the early
1980s, so the number of guarantors has multiplied. 3 Several guarantors
are spin-offs from larger companies and have been operating only since
1989 or 1990. I" Many guarantors, both large and small, are now major
players in the entertainment financing industry. At a time when in-
dependents are earning more professional respect in Hollywood and in
Cannes alike,'" their agents and attorneys are well-advised to decide how
much creative control they want to negotiate with these guarantors/co-
producers.
This article analyzes the rights and obligations assumed by film
guarantors vis-a-vis independents and backers. Part One discusses the
independent's need for creative license and the limits imposed upon that
license by third-party financing. Part Two discusses how guarantors
work beside independents in producing movies, and explains the se-
quence of events triggered when an independent defaults on production.
Part Three outlines important considerations for agents and attorneys
who help independents negotiate guarantees. The Conclusion offers a
working solution to resolve this tension between finances and freedom.
I. THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCER'S GAME
A. Life Outside the Majors
The drive to create a motion picture is a heady experience, which
some independents have compared to compulsive gambling 16 or drug ad-
diction.' 7 Indeed, their battle cry could be, "Give me liberty!" In-
dependents usually work outside of the majors because they perceive
them as a death knell to the creative process. The independent gives up
10. Loynd, supra note 8, at 115.
11. THE ADVENTURES OF BARON MUNCHAUSEN (Columbia 1989).
12. Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
13. Id. Film guarantors have worked in Europe for more than 40 years, and have become
dominant players in the United States only since the mid-1970s. Stephen Chrystie, How Arbi-
tration Clauses 'Ensure' Film Delivery, 4 ENT. L. & FIN. 1 (Feb. 1989).
14. Complete Film Corporation was established in November, 1989; International Film
Guarantors was established in February, 1990; and Galaxy Group was established in March,
1990. Noglows, supra note 6.
15. Matthews, supra note 3, at 23.
16. RICK SCHMIDT, FEATURE FILMMAKING AT USED-CAR PRICES 54 (1988).
17. GREFf, supra note 2, at 53.
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the majors' vast financial resources to avoid the corporate constraints
that accompany those resources.
This reluctance to work for the majors reflects in part constraints
that date back to Hollywood's "studio system" of the 1920s. Each studio
required stars, directors and producers to sign long-term employment
contracts that prevented them from accepting employment elsewhere
while their contracts were in force."8 This system enabled a handful of
majors to monopolize Hollywood's best and brightest talent for decades.
Only a select few broke away, most notably Olivia DeHaviland and Gene
Autry.' 9
Independents shy away from the studio system because they have
the utmost respect for their own creativity. Irwin Winkler, a well-
respected independent in Hollywood, believes the movie industry needs
people like him to rejuvenate itself: "One of the best reasons to do a film
is when everybody tells you you shouldn't do it. Because if you stick to
formulas, you're usually doomed to failure.... When everybody tells
you there's not a chance in the world, that's the one you should go
after."'2
For other independents, the production urge is more playful and
represents a chance to turn fantasy into reality. The thrill of taking an
idea to the big screen without having to satisfy someone else's "bottom
line mentality" is enough of a motive to break away from the majors.
David Puttnam expresses his excitement at being an independent: "I
can't believe my luck, that I'm in a business that allows me to pursue my
hobby. And it does frighten me how many of you are obsessed by how
much money is spent.... I'll never see a penny on the picture, but I'm
enormously proud of it."'"
B. The Need to Finance Production
1. An Independent's Many Jobs
In order to turn fantasies into reality, independents need help from
18. DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT IN-
DUSTRIES 20 (1987).
19. DeHaviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 153 P.2d 983 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944); Autry v.
Republic Prods., 180 P.2d 888 (Cal. 1947).
20. 2 FILMMAKERS ON FILMMAKING 207 (Joseph McBride ed., 1983). Oliver Stone, Os-
car-winning director, commented, "Yeah, I have much more freedom to make the subjects
that I want, but I don't see myself as Darryl Zanuck. I would feel bad if I got indulgent. All
good films come from people with an independent spirit, those who push." De Vries, supra
note 2, at 10.
21. McBRIDE, supra note 20, at 206-07. The film to which Puttnam alluded was The
Duelists starring Albert Finney.
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two types of backers - lenders who will front start-up capital, and a
major that will buy or "pick up" their films and distribute them to the
public. These deals are often more interesting to watch than the films
themselves.22 A guarantor's priority concerns are financing and selling a
film, and must be satisfied before production begins, since independents
may be creatively brilliant but often cannot pay salaries or negotiate
deals with theater chains.
Independents face the same responsibilities as the majors when mak-
ing a motion picture. The tasks involved are diverse: creative direction
(e.g., working with stars and reviewing dailies), line administration (e.g.,
finding equipment and solving logistics), and fund raising.23 The practi-
cal difference between independents and majors is that producers at the
majors can delegate tasks to assistants, whereas independents generally
have smaller staffs and therefore must handle many of these tasks person-
ally.24 In effect, independents must be creators and administrators, as
well as fundraisers that woo prospective investors and distributors.
2. Calculating a Budget
Independents and majors also share horrific production expenses, or
"negative costs." Film productions have become so expensive that Mr.
Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA"), has called for an industry-wide reduction in negative costs.
25
Accordingly, backers require independents to submit ever more detailed
budgets which anticipate possible contingencies that might increase over-
all costs. This is an onerous task because, unlike other commercial budg-
ets, film budgets are inherently detailed and already account for most
22. BIEDERMAN, supra note 18, at 281.
23. Bruce Mallen, Bruce Mallen Discusses Interim Financing, 1 ENT. L. J., July 1982, at
22.
24. MICHAEL WIESE, THE INDEPENDENT FILM AND VIDEOMAKER'S GUIDE 3 (4th ed.
1984).
25. BIEDERMAN, supra note 18, at 282. Average negative costs per film in 1985 were $16
million, which nearly doubled in 5 years, to $26 million per film in 1990. Most negative costs
come from salaries and advertising. Peter J. Dekom, The Motion Picture in 1987- A Study in
Economic Turmoil, in 1987 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 219,
232-33 (1987); Sandra Bodovitz, Attorneys Played Key Role in Making of "Mermaids," L.A.
DAILY J., Mar. 25, 1991, (California Law Business), at 14. The costs are becoming so prohibi-
tive that some producers are declaring bankruptcy as a solution to their financial problems.
Bernie L. Williamson, The Effects ofBankruptcy Procedure on the Collection of Motion Picture
Residuals; in 1989 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 267, 267
(1989); Stephen Chrystie et al., Insolvency and the Production and Distribution ofEntertain-
ment Products, in 1989 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 293, 293
(1989).
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surprises that can disrupt production. 
6
An example of a surprise is when a star commits to production, and
later walks off the set due to "creative differences." Production might
stop altogether until a suitable replacement is hired. Production insur-
ance will cover part of the cost of finding and paying a replacement,2 7 but
the balance must be absorbed into the overall budget. Despite such po-
tential difficulties, independents expect an early commitment from stars.
Talent commitments are important because they are used to calculate the
film's future revenues and can be used as collateral for a bank loan.
28
C. Working with Backers
After making a budget and obtaining star commitments, independ-
ents turn to prospective backers. Established independents have an ad-
vantage because they can point to earlier box office hits to induce backers
to join in on another "sure thing." Nevertheless, even established in-
dependents must compete for the small number of backers in Hollywood.
Backers come in two types - equity and non-equity. 29 Equity back-
ers share financially in a project's ups and downs, enjoying the profits
and paying out to creditors on losses. Non-equity backers, by contrast,
do not share in a film's profits and losses; they only want a return on
their investment.
Although some entrepeneurs welcome equity backers ("general
partners") because they cover business losses during hard times,30 in-
dependents usually do not want equity backers because they will likely
26. WILLIAM B. ADAMS, HANDBOOK FOR MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION 48 (1977);
JOHN QUICK & TOM LABAu, HANDBOOK OF FILM PRODUCTION 45 (1972).
27. Most professional liability and all-risk insurance policies issued to independents pro-
vide coverage for "all risks of direct physical loss or damage" that create extra expenses, such
as replacing stars, broken equipment, or lost film. SYLVIA ALLEN COSTA, How TO PREPARE
A PRODUCTION BUDGET FOR FILM AND VIDEO TAPE 139 (2d ed. 1975); QUICK & LABAU,
supra note 26, at 38. Independents should advise their insurance brokers or agents about all
production risks they reasonably anticipate will occur, in order to clarify the independents'
reasonable expectations of coverage.
28. Michael Meyer & Susan Oman, Note, Production Company Remedies for "Star"
Breaches, 1 ENT. L.J. 25 (1988).
29. For a discussion of the differences between equity and non-equity investors and their
respective roles in film financing, see Dekom, supra note 25, at 232-33.
30. Equity investors are general partners. The law of partnerships is codified under the
Uniform Partnership Act (e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-1543 (1991); CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 15001-15045 (West 1991)). "A partnership is an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." CAL. CORP. CODE § 15006(1) (West 1991).
"All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business."
CAL. CORP. CODE § 15018(e) (West 1991). Partners are also liable for the wrongs of other
partners. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15013, 15018(b) (West 1991); Alioto v. United States, 593 F.
Supp. 1402, 1413 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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desire a voice in production. Independents generally prefer non-equity
backers ("limited partners"), because they only contribute capital and
have no input in the production process. Most movie backers do not
want an equity stake either. As non-equity backers, they are not respon-
sible for paying all the losses if a picture bombs at the box office. 3
The principle categories of backers in film financing today are pri-
vate investors, banks, and majors/distributors. Each one offers unique
attractions and problems from an independent's viewpoint.
1. Private Investors
Limited partnerships were hot topics for discussion at Hollywood
parties until the mid- 1980s, as independents and private investors tried to
search each other out. 2 However, movies became less profitable invest-
ments as the decade ended.3" A heavy blow to investors was the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. 3' It repealed an investment tax credit for motion
31. Non-equity investors are limited partners. The law of limited partnerships is codified
under the Uniform Partnership Act (e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1701-1733 (1991); CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 15501-15532 (West 1991)) and more recently under the Revised Limited Part-
nership Act (e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to -1107 (1991); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 15611-15721 (West 1991), added by 1983 Cal. Stat. 1223, § 10, operative July 1, 1984).
"Limited partnership... means a partnership formed by two or more persons under the laws
of this state and having one or more general partners and one or more limited partners." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 15611 (1) (West 1991). "A limited partner is not liable for any obligation of a
limited partnership unless named as a general partner in the certificate." CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 15632(a) (West 1991).
For the role of limited partnerships in funding motion picture productions, see James L.
Thompson, Comment, Independent Motion Picture Financing: Unregistered Limited Partner-
ship Offerings, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1287 passim.
32. See Dekom, supra note 25, at 232-33. A particularly noteworthy limited partnership
that invests heavily in motion pictures is Silver Screen Partners. BIEDERMAN, supra note 18,
at 282. An October 1991 LEXIS California corporate search shows that Silver Screen Part-
ners II, III, and IV, L.P. were formed in 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. An exemplar
limited partnership agreement for private investors is reprinted in 1 JAY S. KENOFF & RICH-
ARD K. ROSENBERG, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: NEGOTIATING AND DRAFr-
ING GUIDE, Form 13-4 (Donald Farber ed., 1991).
33. Dekom, supra note 25 at 232-33; BIEDERMAN, supra note 18, at 282. Several authors
see the tide turning again in the 1990s, although this time the investors are foreigners spending
yen and deutsche marks rather than Americans with U.S. dollars. See, e.g., Bruce St. J Lillis-
ton, Financing Film and Television Productions in 1990 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND
THE ARTS HANDBOOK 251, 252-53 (1990); Sandra Bodovitz, Attorneys Help Seal the Deals,
L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 25, 1991, (California Law Business), at 22.
34. BIEDERMAN, supra note 18, at 282; KENOFF & ROSENBERG, supra note 32, Form 16-
1, at 17; Thompson, supra note 31, at 1311-12. It is certainly ironic that not even the Internal
Revenue Service can scientifically predict a motion picture's gross profits. GREFt, supra note
2, at 29. Part of the difficulty is the rapidly changing area of tax law related to entertainment
investments generally and film production companies particularly. Schuyler M. Moore, En-
tertainment Industry Affected by Several Tax Developments, 73 J. TAX'N 176, 176-80 (Sept.
1990).
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picture losses that had been available before December 31, 1985. 3-
Independents can no longer rely on private investors seeking tax
breaks. Even with foreigners buying film companies in record num-
bers,36 most private investors are cautious about fronting capital without
a guaranteed return. Independents cannot promise such returns, given
the inherently unpredictable value of any film before it hits the box office.
Nevertheless, funding must be gained quickly once stars commit to a
project, or else they may commit somewhere else. Independents have
little choice but to use other sources of funding.
2. Banks
Banks are more practical financing sources than private investors for
a number of reasons. Banks have the monetary reserves to fund multi-
million dollar pictures. They are staffed with loan officers who under-
stand the technical problems that independents face. Most importantly,
several banks have created an "interim production loan" package, which
offers production financing to many independents. An interim loan gives
independents fairly quick access to funds from a backer with little or no
interest in controlling the production's creative flavor."
Interim loans were first provided in the mid-1970s by Chemical
Bank, City National Bank, and Crocker Bank. 3' They differ significantly
from ordinary commercial loans in four ways: (1) the bank lends both
the principal and the interest needed to repay the principal; (2) the loan
collateral (i.e., the motion picture) is also the vehicle through which the
35. I.R.C. § 48(k) (West Supp. 1989) allows a business credit for "qualified films" (i.e.,
"motion picture film... created primarily for use as public entertainment") but only to the
extent the investor has an "ownership interest" in the film (i.e., "determined on the basis of his
proportionate share of any loss which may be incurred with respect to the production costs of
such film").
I.R.C. § 49(a) (West Supp. 1989) provides that the § 48 business credit shall not apply to
films produced after December 31, 1985. An exception to this repeal is found in I.R.C. § 49(e)
(West Supp. 1989) in discussing such "transition property" as motion pictures. Three condi-
tions must be satisfied before the credit will be allowed: (1) the funds must be paid pursuant to
a public offering before September 26, 1985; (2) 40% of the total funds thus raised must be
spent on productions started before September 26, 1985; and (3) the films thus produced must
be sold under distribution agreements concluded before September 26, 1985. Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 21 l(e), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-647, Title I, § 1002(e)(4)-(7), 102 Stat. 3367, 3368
(1988).
36. See Lilliston, supra note 33, at 252-53; BoDovrrz, supra note 33, at 22.
37. Banks almost uniformly are not interested in becoming equity investors in the movie
project. Their interest lies primarily in recovering the loan proceeds. Nigel Sinclair, Bank
Lending in Independent Film Making, 4 ENT. L. & FIN. 3 (Apr. 1988).
38. Darlene A. Lancer, Bank Financing of Independent Theatrical Film Productions, in
1984 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 71, 71-72 (1984); Mallen,
supra note 23, at 27.
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independent expects to repay the loan; (3) the loan continues to fund
throughout production until the independent delivers the picture to a
distributor; and (4) the distributor (not the independent) is ultimately
responsible for repaying the loan.3 9
However, some independents do not qualify for interim financing.
They may have poor credit references or have difficulty finding a distrib-
utor who wants to agree to the financing terms. In that case, independ-
ents may decide to negotiate a financing/distribution package directly
with a major.
3. Majors/Distributors
The fact that independents sometimes agree to have majors finance
and distribute their films raises a troublesome question: Who ultimately
decides creative issues of production - the independent or the major?
Most independents respond without hesitation: "[B]eing an independent
film maker means you have the ability to make the film you want to
make without having somebody tell you how it should be made."'  As
seen below, majors think differently.41
Independents sometimes choose a major over a bank because they
want to rent the major's extensive financial and technical network. A
major has economic assets such as casualty insurance, bank credit lines,42
and letters of credit4 3 to finance foreign shoots.' It also can rent set
crews, props, cameras, electrical equipment, and post-production facili-
ties.45 A package deal from the major, including financing, costs consid-
erably less than obtaining, financing, and renting items piecemeal.
The majors, however, are usually interested in doing more than just
39. Lancer, supra note 37, at 71-72; Noglows, supra note 6, at 29. Banks discount the
value of the distributor's agreement to buy the film depending on the distributor's credit rating.
Noglows, Foreign Banks Filling Financing Void, VARIETY, Sept. 10, 1990, at 45.
40. Matthews, supra note 3, at 23.
41. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
42. MOLLIE GREGORY, MAKING FILMS YOUR BUSINESS 151-52 (1979).
43. Long-distance buyers and sellers use local banks to negotiate letters of credit when
handling the payment of a business transaction. Letters of credit are commonly used both for
transactions within the United States and for international transactions. Letters of credit are
legally controlled in the United States by Division 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"). The UCC and California's version of the UCC (CAL. COM. CODE §§ 5101-5117
(West 1991)) do not state rigid rules, only fundamental guidelines that recognize customs and
practices of the business community. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Super. Ct., 136 Cal. Rptr. 481,
486 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
44. Letters of credit are standard tools in the entertainment industry for financing foreign
location shoots. Mallen, supra note 23, at 26.
45. PAUL N. LAZARUS III, THE MOVIE PRODUCER: A HANDBOOK FOR PRODUCING AND
PICTURE MAKING 46 (1985).
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renting equipment. They prefer to negotiate equipment rentals within a
larger package, which includes funding and distributing the independ-
ent's picture, especially when the major's in-house inventory of releases is
low. The two most frequent package deals made are "straight distribu-
tions" and "negative pickups."
A straight distribution deal is a comprehensive agreement between
the independent and major. It requires the major to distribute the in-
dependent's picture in exchange for the independent paying the major a
percentage of the picture's gross profits.46 Both sides benefit from
straight distribution: independents acquire a major's name-recognition
value on their picture's release, and the major gets a larger payment than
from merely renting equipment.47 Straight distribution might not pro-
vide sufficient funds to complete production, however, particularly if the
independent cannot secure collateral funding from private investors or
banks.
In contrast to the straight distribution deal, a negative pickup deal
involves more than enough funding to complete production, because the
deal advances production costs along with distribution costs. It requires
the major to front the independent a percentage of the film's estimated
gross profits to pay for the costs of production. In exchange for the ad-
vance, the independent agrees to deliver a "reasonable facsimile" of the
script before production starts.48  Negative pickups are very popular
among independents who use them as collateral for bank loans, and
thereby sidestep the possibility of the major's controlling creative deci-
sions because it is funding production.49
A negative pickup, however, poses problems of its own. The agree-
ment's terms usually provide that the independent finish the picture in
complete conformity with the script. If a picture materially deviates
from its script, the major is entitled to reject it and sue for contractual
damages under the agreement. 50 Hence, no funding package is entirely
46. The industry standard for calculating a film's profit is 3 to 7 times the film's total
negative costs, which in turn equals '/4 to 1/2 the film's gross revenues. As an illustration, a
film costing $10 million to produce and distribute must gross a minimum of $70 million to
avoid creating a loss. Id. at 46, 48.
47. Id at 49. Majors can also cover their negative costs by selling pre-distribution rights
("pre-sales") to television, cable, video, and foreign markets. Pre-sales only represent antici-
pated revenues in particular markets. If enough films are actually distributed over a predeter-
mined time period, pre-sales are deemed irrelevant because distribution revenues theoretically
will generate sufficient amounts to equal or outweigh the pre-sales. See Dekom, supra note 25.
48. GREGORY, supra note 42, at 152. For a more detailed treatment of negative pickup
deals, see Chrystie et al., supra note 25, at 295-96.
49. GREFt, supra note 2, at 8-10.
50. GREGORY, supra note 42, at 152.
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satisfactory from the independent's viewpoint.
D. The Bonding Requirement
1. The Financing Triad
The typical financing arrangement for a motion picture consists of
three parties: the independent and two backers - a lender and a distrib-
utor. Sometimes a major may act as both the lender and the distributor.
The guarantor works with all three parties to ensure that the film is com-
pleted on time and under budget. In other words, the guarantor's job is
to assure backers that an independent will comply with all the terms of
their agreements:
"Completion Guarantor" means a third party guarantor who
may agree to advance funds necessary above the final approved
budget of the Picture to complete the Picture in conformity
with its final approved shooting script, notwithstanding the fact
that the "final negative cost" of the Picture may exceed the fi-
nal approved budget."1
The guarantor is not a member of the triad, but works for the benefit of
the backers through the independent. The guarantor's rights and obliga-
tions arise from a separate guarantee agreement with the independent.5 2
2. Why Independents Like Guarantors
Independents want to have guarantors approve their films for vari-
ous reasons. Less experienced independents may consider a guarantee
the equivalent of "money in the bank" for paying backers, in case pro-
duction fails and backers come looking for their money. Older independ-
ents want to preserve the profession's good reputation, and have
commented that they like guarantors because younger independents can
benefit from the guarantor's "good discipline" on the set."
Banks welcome the professional services a guarantor offers them. A
guarantor meets with a loan officer before the bank ever issues a loan,
and examines on the bank's behalf all the production documents needed
51. KENOFF & ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at Form 13-4, cl. 1.15. See also LAZARUS,
supra note 45, at 52; Chrystie et al., supra note 25, at 296.
52. Nigel Sinclair, Key Fornsfor a Film-Production Loan, 4 ENT. L. & FIN. 4 (May 1989).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2792 (West 1991) provides: "Where a suretyship obligation is entered into
at the same time with the original obligation, or with the acceptance of the latter by the credi-
tor, and forms with that obligation a part of the consideration to him, no other consideration
need exist. In all other cases there must be a consideration distinct from that of the original
obligation."
53. Loynd, supra note 8, at 116.
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to secure the loan. 4 The guarantor analyzes every contingency that
could stop production, and recommends ways to prevent problems before
they occur." Banks also appreciate a guarantor's willingness to mediate
loan disputes that arise between themselves and independents.5 6 Ms.
Bette Smith of the Completion Bond Company, a prominent guarantor,
comments, "We view ourselves as a support organization. Our job is to
help producers and directors overcome problems and overcome them
quickly.""
Majors generally have no need to work with guarantors on in-house
projects, due to their relatively extensive financial resources. Most of
their contact with guarantors arises when they purchase an independ-
ent's film for their inventory and require the independent to buy a guar-
antee during production. However, majors that co-produce a picture
with other majors and anticipate inter-studio disputes, will make an ex-
ception and purchase a guarantee themselves." s
3. Additional Benefits
Backers want to see a film guaranteed for another reason. Guaran-
tors are not insurers, but they negotiate with major insurance companies
such as Lloyd's of London, Fireman's Fund, and Transamerica, for addi-
tional coverage if a guarantor cannot pay its obligations to backers.5 9
Therefore, backers write into their financing agreements with independ-
54. The guarantor reviews the full range of documents needed to secure interim financing,
including loan applications, lease agreements, distribution agreements, certificates of insur-
ance, shooting schedules, laboratory pledgeholders' agreements, contingency budgets, lists of
beneficiaries and other lenders, "above the line" agreements (e.g., literary property agreements,
screenwriter agreements, inducement letters to key personnel, and salary schedules), other fi-
nancing agreements, union agreements, and letters from distributors on recoupment of com-
pletion sums. See PAUL A. BAUMGARTEN & MORTON L. LEAVY, LEGAL AND BUSINESS
PROBLEMS OF FINANCING MOTION PICTURES at 350, 388 (1979).
55. Richard Soames of Film Finances, a prominent guarantor, revealed that his company
will not write a letter of intent to bond a film "unless all production monies are in place."
Loynd, supra note 8, at 114.
56. Id at 115.
57. Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
58. Loynd, supra note 8, at 115; Noglows, supra note 6, at 29. Productions involving two
or more majors are more frequent than ever. Lilliston, supra note 33, at 253-54. Many con-
tract disputes between majors, or disputes between a major and a director are resolved through
the relevant guild, collective bargaining agreement, or arbitration tribunal. BIEDERMAN,
supra note 18, at 283-84.
59. Lancer, supra note 38, at 74. For example, Film Finances is covered by Lloyd's of
London, and the Completion Bond Company is covered by its owner, Transamerica.
Noglows, supra note 6, at 29. Similarly, Fireman's Fund established International Film Guar-
antors (in February, 1990). Id. The guarantor and insurance company divide the guarantee
premium between themselves. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 342.
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ents a provision that they "cut through" as direct beneficiaries of these
proceeds. 6°
These funds, however, are seldom tapped. The guarantor must first
exhaust a contingency fund - usually ten percent of a movie's produc-
tion costs set aside by the independent before shooting begins - and
then its own assets before it can give the insurance company notice of a
claim.61
II. ANATOMY OF A COMPLETION GUARANTEE
A. Identifying the Players
The concept of finance companies guaranteeing the completion of a
motion picture is not novel. Film guarantors have worked in Europe for
decades. They gained attention in Hollywood in the 1980s with the sud-
den proliferation of independent production companies and the desire of
backers to avoid repeating such notable flops as Heaven's Gate, which
went grossly over budget. 62 Despite their success, the working styles of
guarantors are still unfamilar to many in Hollywood. 63 Even when they
are listed in reference books, the identities and function of guarantors are
not discussed.6
1. Names of Well-Known Guarantors
A relatively small number of guarantors handle today's high volume
business of bonding independent films. More than half of all films
bonded worldwide are handled by only two companies - Film Finances
and the Completion Bond Company.65 Other notable guarantors in-
clude: Cine Guarantors, Complete Film Corporation, Entertainment
Completions, Inc., Galaxy Group, International Film Guarantors, Mo-
tion Picture Bond Company, Motion Picture Guarantors (a Toronto-
based company), Percenterprises Completion Services, Performance
60. SINCLAIR, supra note 52, at 4. For an exemplar financing agreement that obliges the
guarantor to give lenders "cut-through" endorsements, see KENOFF & ROSENBERG, supra note
32, Form 16-1, at 16-11 (para. 4(a)(ii)).
61. Loynd, supra note 8, at 114, 116.
62. HEAVEN'S GATE (United Artists 1980). It earned $1.5 million against $44 million
spent in negative costs (or $57 million, if one adds the distribution costs and studio overhead).
PATRICK ROBERTSON, GuINNESS MOVIE FACTS AND FEATS 30 (1988).
63. SINCLAIR, supra note 52, at 4.
64. See. e.g., IRA KONIGSBERG, THE COMPLETE FILM DICTIONARY 60 (1987); RALPH S.
SINGLETON, FILMMAKER'S DICTIONARY 35, 78 (1986).
65. Loynd, supra note 8, at 114. A recent study states that together these two companies
bond more than 100 pictures annually. Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
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Guarantees, Inc., and Rampart Services.66
2. Distinguishing a Guarantee from Insurance
Independents should not confuse a film guarantee with production
insurance. The law defines guarantors as sureties and not as insurers. In
fact, "guarantor" and "surety" are interchangeable legal terms. 6 7 The
difference between a guarantee and insurance is one of function, in that
guarantors do not operate like insurers.68
An insurer covers the independent for surprise losses that disrupt
production and damage the independent. In contrast, a guarantor pays
backers - not the independent - for investments that are lost when the
independent does not shoot a picture according to the backers' terms. A
guarantor or surety is "one who undertakes to pay money or to do any
other act in event that his principal [the independent] fails therein.",
69
In addition to providing coverage if production collapses, a film
guarantor also lends an independent its name value and expertise in mar-
keting pictures for use in negotiating with prospective backers. However,
at the risk of being blackballed in the industry, the independent bears the
ultimate responsibility of paying back the losses it generates, even when
the guarantor initially pays out claims. The guarantor is entitled to re-
cover its payments, with interest, from the independent.7°
66. Lancer, supra note 38, at 74; Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
67. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2787 (West 1991), which provides in pertinent part: "The
distinction between sureties and guarantors is hereby abolished. The terms and their deriva-
tives... shall have the same meaning." California courts construe guarantee agreements as
they would construe surety agreements. See, e.g., Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank v. Olsen, 116
Cal. Rptr. 4, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
68. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr.
291,.298 at n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 546, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Mahana v. Alexander, 263 P. 260, 263 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1927). See also CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01[4] (1991);
GuY 0. KORNBLUM ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: BAD FAITH § 6:59 (1990).
However, some fidelity bonds are purchased for indemnity, like insurance, to cover third par-
ties for losses. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(2) (West 1991); Alberts v. American Casualty
Co., 200 P.2d 37, 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
Other jurisdictions have also refused to equate guarantors with insurers. See, e.g., Na-
tional Sur. Corp. v. Charles Carter & Co., 539 F.2d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 1976); Township of
Wyckoff v. Sarna, 347 A.2d 16, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975); Water Works, Gas & Sewer Bd. v.
P.A. Buchanan Contracting Co., 318 So. 2d 267, 269 (Ala. 1975).
69. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (5th ed. 1979). That definition is codified under
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2787 (West 1991), which provides in pertinent part: "A surety or guarantor
is one who promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another .... For an
overview of surety law in California, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2787-2855 (West 1991) and W.J.
CONNERS, CALIFORNIA SURETY & FIDELITY BOND PRACTICE (1969 & Supp. June 1991).
70. "If a surety satisfies the principal obligation, or any part thereof, whether with or
without legal proceedings, the principal is bound to reimburse what he has disbursed, includ-
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In performing these functions, film guarantors meet the traditional
definition of a surety. If their roles ended there, guarantors would repre-
sent the singular blessing that many independents and backers consider
them to be. This description, however, does not constitute all that a film
guarantor must do if an independent goes over budget or beyond sched-
ule. Unlike other types of guarantors, the film guarantor has a broad
contractual right to intervene, take over production and exercise all of its
legal rights against backers and other third parties.7
B. Components of the Guarantee
1. Formal Documents
When an independent first applies for an interim loan, the bank of-
ficer refers the producer to a list of preferred guarantors. The independ-
ent selects a guarantor and pays it a commitment fee to review the
production documents attached to the loan application.72 If the guaran-
tor approves the paperwork, it issues the independent a letter of intent to
bond the film. The letter does not commit the guarantor. Nonetheless, it
is an important record of the initial negotiations.73 Additionally, the par-
ties can agree therein to identify which party will be responsible for spe-
cific tasks if one of the parties later disputes the guarantee's terms.7 4
Once an independent and guarantor have agreed on the guarantee's
terms, they execute a guarantee agreement. This agreement, preferably
in writing, confers a number of production-related rights and duties on
ing necessary costs and expenses; but the surety has no claim for reimbursement against other
persons, though they may have benefitted by his act .... " CAL. CIv. CODE § 2847 (West
1991). Legally, a guarantor can refuse to cover backers' losses if the independent did not
default on production. See. e.g., Western World Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 358 So.
2d 602, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
71. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 377; Sinclair, supra note 37, at 3.
72. Noglows, supra note 6, at 29. See also BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 343,
350, 388.
73. For an exemplar letter of intent, see KENOFF & ROSENBERG, supra note 32, Form 13-
1. This exemplar is between an independent and the bank. It includes a "completion bond
clause," which provides: "The Investment shall be delivered by cashier's check made payable
to (name of production company) upon delivery to [bank] of a duly-executed completion guar-
anty and a fully-executed distribution agreement."
Agents and attorneys are advised to consider every party's expectations when drafting
every letter of intent. In this way, one can avoid the circular process, which can be very
frustrating, whereby a guarantor wants to see the independent's financing before agreeing to
issue a letter to bond production, and a bank wants to see the guarantee before issuing a letter
to fund production. See, e.g., 14TH ANNUAL PROGRAM ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EN-
TERTAINMENT INDUSTRY: PRODUCTION FINANCING 6 (1968).
74. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 366; KENOFF & ROSENBERG, supra note
32, at Form 13-1.
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the guarantor." After backers have funded the start of production, the
guarantor assigns a representative to supervise production and assure
backers that the independent will comply with the script and financing
agreements. The representative must approve every phase of production
until the distributor accepts the finished product. 6 Hence, the independ-
ent's lament: "[Y]ou are only as independent as the deal you can cut. In
that sense, it's no different from working within the studio system. The
more money you need, the more help you're going to get.""
The guarantee agreement is paid with a premium. Until two or
three years ago, guarantee agreements routinely provided that independ-
ents pay five or six percent of their total production budget as a pre-
mium. This has changed. The current flurry of new guarantors has
forced some competitors to adjust their premiums downward. Currently,
some premiums are as low as 1.5% of the budget.78 Other guarantors
lower their premiums if an independent has an extremely high budget or
buys a multi-picture guarantee, also known as a "continuing" guaran-
tee. 79 The guarantor places the premium in a reserve fund, which is used
to pay claims if the independent defaults on any of its obligations.80
75. Sinclair, supra note 37, at 3. An exemplar guarantee agreement is reprinted in BAUM-
GARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 349-87. The writing requirement is codified in CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2793 (West 1991): "[A] suretyship obligation must be in writing, and signed by the
surety; but the writing need not express a consideration." However, an oral guaranty is not
void, merely voidable. Salomon v. Ellis, 94 P.2d 393, 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
76. Sinclair, supra note 37, at 5; Sinclair, supra note 52, at 5. If the independent does not
sign a distribution deal before the film is guaranteed, the guarantor usually reserves for itself
(in the guarantee agreement) the right to approve all pending and future distribution deals.
BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 346.
77. Matthews, supra note 3, at 23.
78. Bette Smith, The Negative Pickup: Is It a Fair Deal?. 3d Annual Entertainment Law
Symposium, U.S.C. Law Center (Mar. 23, 1988).
Mr. Lawrence Vanger, president of Performance Guarantees, Inc. (established in 1986),
questions whether the move to lower premiums is smart for business: "The market has been
driven down competitively to the point where, for most, if not all of the bonding people, it's a
question of non-profitmaking productivity." Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
The premium is authorized by CAL. CIV. CODE § 2811 (West 1991), which provides in
pertinent part: "Any party required to give a bond undertaking or other obligation may agree
with his surety for the deposit of any money and assets for which the surety is responsible with
a bank ... for the safekeeping of such money and assets ...."
79. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2814 (West 1991); Loynd, supra note 8, at 114. A contin-
uing guaranty may be revoked absent ongoing payments of cash into the reserve. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2815 (West 1991).
80. GREGORY, supra note 42, at 154. The guarantor may also negotiate to acquire a per-
centage of the film's gross or net revenues if the guarantor is compelled to pay out claims. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2849 (West 1991). This "percentage clause" is similar to penalty pro-
visions in the major/distributor's deals with the independent. The guarantor's clause often
requires the guarantor get 1% of the film's net revenues for every 1% of the budget that it
must pay out. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 346-47.
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Legally, this is not a trust account held for the independent's benefit;"1 it
remains the independent's property until production is finished. 2
Many guarantors build an incentive around the premium to en-
courage independents to work under budget. If an independent com-
pletes production satisfactorily and no claims must be paid, the
independent is entitled to negotiate a rebate, also known as a "no claims
bonus," of up to half of the original premium amount.8 3 This is an im-
portant incentive for new independents who have only secured minimal
financing initially.
Lastly, the parties are advised to draft a reciprocal inter-party agree-
ment that addresses the needs of the guarantor, the independent, and all
the backers. The guarantor probably will advocate the need for a single,
inclusive document that defines all potential conflicts of interest. Exam-
ples of potential conflicts are priorities in security interests, set-off rights,
and respective rights to insurance proceeds.8 4 The guarantor wants to
protect itself in case, for example, the shooting schedule stops abruptly
81. BIEDERMAN, supra note 18, at 367-68. However, the independent is treated as a
trustee of all investors' funds and royalties during production. See, e.g., KENOFF & ROSEN-
BERG, supra note 32, at Form 16-1, cl. 11:
FUNDS HELD IN TRUST: All monies received by Production Company which are
payable to Investor in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement shall be held
by Production Company, in trust, for the sole use and benefit of Investor and shall be
immediately deposited upon receipt in a separate interest-bearing bank account nam-
ing Investor as the beneficiary thereof. Production Company shall not commingle
the monies payable to Investor hereunder with other monies of Production
Company.
Even though third parties cannot sue the guarantor as trustee to force payment of claims,
they can still sue the guarantor based on its obligations under the guarantee agreement.
Strangely enough, the reverse is not true as well. The otherwise astute guarantor is not entitled
ordinarily under the independent's financing agreements to sue backers if they do not fund
production as promised. The following exemplar financing agreement, id. at Form 16-1, cl.
17(b) provides: "This [financing] agreement shall in no event be construed as a third party
beneficiary contract and is not intended for the benefit of any person or company whomsoever
except the parties hereto."
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 114 cmt. b (1981). The guarantee agree-
ment gives the guarantor a security interest in the reserve. Sinclair, supra note 52, at 4. That
security interest is perfected over all other creditors' liens and security interests, except for
liens imposed by law or by subordination agreements. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note
54, at 372-73.
California's law on security interests and its relation to Division 9 of the UCC is reviewed
in 3 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, "Secured Transactions" § 51 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1991). Regarding California statutory liens, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2872-2877
(West 1991). For a discussion of federal tax priorities, see, e.g., Gold Coast Leasing Co. v.
California Carrots, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 511, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Peter F. Coogan, The
Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1968).
83. Lancer, supra note 38, at 74.
84. "Several contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as
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because a lender does not fund production as promised. 5 The guarantor
invariably intervenes before that point and negotiates a new inter-party
agreement. 86
2. Supervising Production
The guarantor is not legally obligated to cover production losses or
take over production until backers actually start paying for production to
begin.87 The independent deposits these funds into a "production ac-
count" at a bank approved by the guarantor.88
The guarantor's designated representative then begins to act as a
super-producer on the set, supervising the independent. The representa-
tive exercises its knowledge and expertise by estimating the budget re-
quirements for each scene and imposing restraints if the independent
exceeds those demands.89 Equally important is the representative's ulti-
mate power to replace key personnel if it reasonably decides that produc-
tion has become too expensive. 90
The representative is never a passive observer on the set. The guar-
antee agreement requires the representative to intervene and order pro-
duction stopped when it reasonably believes an independent will go over
budget or miss the deadline for delivering a picture to the distributor.
This situation occurs frequently on location shoots in unstable foreign
countries.91 This does not mean the representative wants to disrupt the
independent's creative vision. Nonetheless, the representative is respon-
parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1642
(West 1991).
85. Sinclair, supra note 52, at 4-5. A guarantor's obligations on behalf of an independent
are not extinguished, even when the independent legally is not required to continue shooting
because all of the backers have illegally failed to fund production, unless the lenders either
agree to hold the guarantor harmless or fail to sue the guarantor in a timely fashion. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2825 (West 1991).
86. Some guarantors employ in-house counsel for such matters. See, e.g., Sharon Gottes-
feld Resident Attorney, Completion Bond Co., DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 5, 1983, at 4. The Com-
pletion Bond Company sends work out to the law firm of Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman in
Beverly Hills. Sampler of Large Firm Entertainment Practices, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 25, 1991,
(California Law Business), at 10.
87. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 359. The guarantor cannot be forced to
pay anything if the independent does not obtain sufficient funds to satisfy the entire production
budget.
88. Id. at 350.
89. COSTA, supra note 27, at 7. The representative operates like a unit production man-
ager breaking the script into individual scenes and then allotting each scene a specific budget-
ary amount to complete it. The representative uses a mathematical formula to calculate a
precise daily accounting of both daily and overall disbursements. Id.
90. See BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 368.
91. Foreign shoots in the Soviet Union by American independents were strictly prohibited
BONDING COMPANIES AND GUARANTORS
sible for overseeing all disbursements and reviewing all dailies, and must
approve all periodic progress reports.92 This constant scrutiny is neces-
sary to protect the guarantor should backers start to make claims against
it.
3. Limits on a Guarantor's Obligation
A guarantor's obligation toward backers is not unlimited, but is de-
fined by the terms of the guarantee agreement reached with the in-
dependent. This includes the maximum amount a guarantor is obliged to
pay out, regardless of the actual amounts that backers lose.93 Thus, a
backer can lose thousands or millions of dollars and not be able to recoup
from the guarantor any money in excess of the guarantee limit.
To protect their interests, guarantors are advised to negotiate with
specificity all their obligations to backers in the guarantee agreement.
This prevents backers from contending after a loss occurs that a guaran-
tor has somehow agreed to assume a responsibility that is not spelled out
therein.94 In short, the guarantor's production responsibilities are identi-
cal to those of the independent.95
Sometimes a guarantor does not need to pay the backers' losses at
all. The guarantor is let off entirely if the independent - without the
guarantor's consent - alters the guarantee agreement or other contracts
so as to increase the guarantor's obligations to backers or other parties.
Often this happens when the independent negotiates a new repayment
deal with different interest rates,96 agrees to pay crew salaries before they
by guarantors until the mid-1980s because guarantors considered local conditions too unpre-
dictable for bonding purposes. Loynd, supra note 8, at 116.
92. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 368-69; LAZARUS, supra note 45, at 52. A
spokesperson for Entertainment Completions once said that his company looks to the produc-
tion's end results and not at "piecemeal things." Loynd, supra note 8, at 116.
93. LAZARUS, supra note 45, at 52; Sinclair, supra note 52, at 4. See, e.g., Kane v. Men-
denhall, 56 P.2d 498, 500 (Cal. 1936); Petrovich v. City of Arcadia, 222 P.2d 231, 236 (Cal.
1950). However, accrued interest on the guarantee may be recovered in addition to the guar-
antee amount, and the total amount can thus exceed the guarantee amount. See, e.g., Bums v.
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 146 P.2d 29, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
94. See, e.g., Michel & Pfeffer v. Oceanside Properties, Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 179, 183 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976).
95. "The obligation of a surety must be neither larger in amount nor in other respects
more burdensome than that of the principal; and if in its terms it exceeds it, it is reducible in
proportion to the principal obligation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 1991). See also, e.g.,
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. City of Berkeley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 387, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
County of Los Angeles v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 101, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
96. "A surety is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if by
any act of the creditor, without the consent of the surety the original obligation of the principal
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are due,97 or does not pay production insurance premiums. 98
The guarantor is also not liable to pay backers if it becomes econom-
ically impractical for the guarantor to take over production and complete
the picture as originally planned. This occurs, for example, when back-
ers invest in a movie based on the independent's track record, and that
independent suddenly dies. Another scenario occurs when production
hinges on backers making timely deposits to the production account, and
payments stop without warning.99 In these circumstances, however, the
guarantor is not relieved of liability automatically, but must prove to all
parties (and to the court if litigation ensues) that such surprises have
irrevocably prejudiced its interests."°° If the guarantor then does not act
quickly to revoke the guarantee, backers are entitled to demand that the
guarantor cover their losses.' 0
C. Taking Over Production and Paying Claims
A number of incidents can trigger a guarantor's obligation to inter-
vene and take a more active role in production. In one scenario, an in-
dependent completes a picture and delivers it to the major/distributor
pursuant to a negative pickup agreement. The distributor then rejects
is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in
respect thereto, is in any way impaired or suspended." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2819 (West 1991).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2821 (West 1991) provides: "The rescission of an agreement altering
the original obligation of a debtor, or impairing the remedy of a creditor, does not restore the
liability of a surety who has been exonerated by such agreement."
97. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2819 (West 1991).
98. See, e.g., 13 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 47:315 (2d ed.
rev. 1982). Nor is the guarantor required to pay legal fees or any judgment that arises from the
independent's tortious conduct during production, notwithstanding standard language in
many guarantee agreements that purportedly cover "production liabilities." Id. at § 47:320;
see also National Sur. Corp. v. Charles Carter & Co., 539 F.2d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 1976). On
the other hand, the guarantor must pay premiums for workers' compensation insurance if the
independent neglects to pay them. COUCH, supra, § 47:319.
99. See, e.g., Gaffigan v. Lawton, 37 P.2d 79, 80 (Cal. 1934); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§ 112 (1941). The guarantor's obligations are exonerated if the independent cancels produc-
tion before spending the entire budget. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 370.
100. The guarantor is still obligated to cover the independent's deals, even if those deals are
modified to include fraud. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1640 (West 1991) provides: "When, through
fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties,
such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing disregarded." See also
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1667-1668 (West 1991) for California's public policy on fraudulent
contracts.
101. See, e.g., Katz v. Haskell, 16 Cal. Rptr. 453, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). See also Ray-
mond T. Sung, Comment, Issues in the Enforcement of Carry Guarantees and Completion
Guarantees" Anti-Deficiency Rules, Suretyship Statutes, and Common Law, 37 UCLA L. REV.
225 (1989).
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the picture, claiming it does not comply with the script. 10 2 Even if the
independent has remained in control of production, the guarantor is re-
quired to aid in correcting the problem. 10 3 In another scenario, the guar-
antor steps in because a backer establishes that it cannot recover its
investment, or stops funding production due to the independent's breach
of a material term of their agreement."4
Claims are not paid out, however, simply because backers lose
money. Before a guarantor pays out claims, the backer must prove its
losses are covered under the guarantee agreement.'0o This becomes com-
plicated if the independent purchased a multi-picture guarantee, since the
backer must specify the losses pertaining to each film covered by the
guarantee. 16
A guarantor generally has two choices when production "blows
up."'0 7 The more draconian choice entails taking over production.
Under this option, the guarantor may fire and replace the production
crew, change locations and shooting schedules, and terminate agree-
ments made by the independent that the guarantor considers superfluous
to finishing the picture. 8 The independent agrees, as part of the guaran-
tee agreement, to waive any liability against the guarantor for taking over
102. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
103. This requirement was discussed recently in the bonding of MERMAIDS (Orion 1990).
See Bodovitz, supra note 25, at 14. "A surety who has assumed liability for payment or per-
formance is liable to the creditor immediately upon the default of the principal, and without
demand or notice." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2807 (West 1991). See, eg., Baralat Dev. Co. v.
Lichtner, 236 Cal. Rptr. 701, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
"Where one assumes liability as surety upon a conditional obligation, his liability is com-
mensurate with that of the principal, and he is not entitled to notice of the default of the
principal, unless he is unable, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, to acquire information of
such default, and the creditor has actual notice thereof." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2808 (West
1991). See, e.g., American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 109 Cal. Rptr.
545, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 990 (1974).
104. The guarantee agreement usually provides an objective standard for determining when
the guarantor must pay out to backers, e.g., when the negative costs exceed a pre-agreed per-
centage over budget or when production exceeds a specified number of days behind schedule.
Thompson, supra note 31, at 1298.
105. See, e.g., Weisz Trucking Co. v. Emil R. Wohl Constr., 91 Cal. Rptr. 489, 493 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1970); COUCH, supra note 98, § 47:267.
106. Some costs are disallowed by guarantors. Production materials that are delivered to a
location shoot or post-production site typically are not covered because they are not used just
on one picture. The guarantor likewise does not cover the costs of materials that the independ-
ent is expected to furnish at one site and then transfer to another site for a future production.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2822 (West 1991) provides that if the lender accepts any payment in partial
satisfaction of the loss, the guarantor's obligation is reduced proportionally but not extin-
guished completely.
107. Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
108. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 378. This procedure is relatively easy to
implement because the guarantor requires the independent to grant the guarantor an irrevoca-
118 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
production.'0 9
The more common choice is to step between the warring parties and
help negotiate new deals that will salvage both the picture and invest-
ments. 110 Before taking this step, some guarantors have used the pros-
pect of a takeover to prevent the war from ever starting by persuading
independents to stick to their script and budget."
An independent cannot rely on the guarantor's obligations in order
to avoid paying for its mistakes. To the contrary, the independent must
reimburse the guarantor, with interest, for any funds the guarantor ex-
pends from its own coffers after the production account is exhausted.11 2
The guarantor is repaid from the movie's gross profits after the distribu-
tor deducts fees and costs, and before other creditors are paid. 13 As a
further sign of its powerful status, the guarantor, after taking over pro-
duction, puts backers on notice that they must pay the guarantor, not the
independent, to continue production. 14
III. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN PURCHASING A BOND
A. Draft an Unambiguous Agreement
Independents and backers are advised to draft carefully the guaran-
ble power of attorney (coupled with an interest) to make all deals necessary to finish produc-
tion. Id at 377-78.
109. Id at 380-81.
110. Id at 375-77; GREGORY, supra note 42, at 154.
111. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 346. However, the guarantor cannot force
the independent to pay specific expenses. That right belongs exclusively to backers under the
terms of their financing agreements. Still, the guarantor can compel the independent to pay
specific expenses if the independent spends the budget on improper things and the guarantor's
failure to intervene would increase the total costs of production.
112. Id at 381. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2847 (West 1991) provides in pertinent part: "If a
surety satisfies the principal obligation, or any part thereof, whether with or without legal
proceedings, the principal is bound to reimburse what he has disbursed, including necessary
costs and expenses ... "
When a guarantor pays out to cover for the independent, the guarantor is subrogated to
the lender's claims against the independent. Leatherby Ins. v. City of Tustin, 143 Cal. Rptr.
153, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). CAL. CIv. CODE § 2848 (West 1991) provides in pertinent part:
"A surety, upon satisfying the obligation of the principal, is entitled to enforce every remedy
which the creditor then has against the principal to the extent of reimbursing what he has
expended .... " Section 2848 was not intended to preclude implied indemnity. Commercial
Standard Ins. v. Bank of Am., 129 Cal. Rptr. 91, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
113. BAUMGARTEN & LEAVY, supra note 54, at 381. A California trial court has ruled that
Hollywood's standards of deducting a picture's negative costs from the gross can be "uncon-
scionable." Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. case no.
C706083 (1990). One commentator has listed the court's ruling as a significant milepost in
entertainment law. Ron Smith, 10 Legal Events That Shook Hollywood, L.A. DAILY J., Mar.
25, 1991, (California Law Business), at 26.
114. COUCH, supra note 98, § 47:55.
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tee agreement and other production documents, such as financing agree-
ments and inter-party agreements. Documents should be drafted to
reflect the parties' intent at the time they agreed to the deal." 5 Although
every guarantee agreement ideally is the product of arms-length negotia-
tion, people in the entertainment industry frequently do not get involved
in the drafting process and rely instead on the guarantor's expertise for
drafting an air-tight, all-encompassing document that covers every con-
tingency. The decision to rely on a guarantor may be ill-fated, as the
resulting document will only be as good as the guarantor's drafting
abilities.
Independents are encouraged to take an active part in negotiating
the conditions on which they expect the guarantor either to intervene or
pay backers' claims, because the guarantor surely will try to limit those
conditions." 6 Mutual involvement in drafting the agreement is essential
to future good will, lest the parties later argue that the document is am-
biguous, and their original contractual intent must then be analyzed.
Like other contracts, a guarantee agreement is interpreted according to
traditional rules of contract formation.' 17 It is read according to the
plain meaning of its terms,' 8 except where it uses terms of art readily
familiar to people in the industry. "9 If a guarantor alone drafts the guar-
antee agreement and the resulting document is ambiguous, the ambiguity
will be construed according to how the guarantor believed the independ-
ent understood the provision.' 20 The ambiguous term will be interpreted
in favor of the independent and against the guarantor-drafter.' 2'
115. "When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained
from the writing alone, if possible .... " CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639 (West 1991).
116. "However broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things con-
cerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1648 (West
1991).
117. "In interpreting the terms of a contract of suretyship, the same rules are to be observed
as in the case of other contracts .. " CAL. Ov. CODE § 2837 (West 1991). Those rules are
codified under CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1549-1701 (West 1991). Specific statutes regarding con-
tract interpretation are found at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1635-1662 (West 1991).
118. "The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and
explicit, and does not involve an absurdity." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1638 (West 1991).
119. "The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense,
rather than according to their strict legal meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical
sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the latter must be
followed." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1644 (West 1991).
120. "If the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be inter-
preted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee
understood it." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1649 (West 1991).
121. "In cases of uncertainty ... the language of a contract should be interpreted most
strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654
(West 1991).
1992]
120 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
B Perform in Good Faith
In addition to abiding by the express terms, every party to a con-
tract has an implied good faith obligation to cooperate in completing the
film. 12 2 The independent is obliged to finish production on schedule,
under budget, and according to the script. Backers are obliged to fund
production. The distributor is obliged to accept the film and distribute it.
The guarantor is obliged to cover the backers' losses if production "blows
up." The precise nature and extent of each party's good faith obligation
is based on the agreements between the parties and their reasonable ex-
pectations of how the parties will perform their respective obligations.
23
Independents and backers should know that guarantors face unique
penalties if they breach their implied good faith obligation. The State
Insurance Commissioner regulates guarantors. 124 Therefore, guarantors
are liable for bad faith practices 2 ' if they unreasonably fail to pay out
claims when the independent's fault is reasonably clear. 126  When the
court finds that a guarantor acted in bad faith, the prevailing party is
entitled to recover the bond amount, consequential damages, and in an
appropriate case, punitive damages and attorney's fees.
127
122. See, eg., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Lamb Finance, 303 P.2d 86, 97
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is incorporated into
every oral and written contract. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins., 510 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Cal. 1973);
Communale v. Traders & General Ins., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958).
123. See, e.g., Commercial Union Assur. v. Safeway Stores, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Cal.
1980); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 598 P.2d 452, 456 (Cal. 1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S.
912 (1980).
124. A guarantor is "in the business of insurance." CAL. INS. CODE § 105.
125. "[O]bligees under surety contracts are as susceptible to deceptive and unfair claims
settlement practices as insurers [sic] and claimants under liability insurance contracts." Gen-
eral Ins. of Am. v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr. 291, 298 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
However, independents and lenders can sue guarantors only for common law bad faith,
not for statutory bad faith. First-party and third-party private causes of action are no longer
permitted under CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1991) ("insurance bad faith"), ever since
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988). Nonetheless, independents
and lenders may still submit § 790 complaints to the Insurance Commissioner, who is empow-
ered to impose civil penalties under CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.05-.035(a) (West 1991).
126. See, e.g., Pacific-S. Mortgage Trust v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 212 Cal. Rptr. 754,
761 (Cal. 1985).
127. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr.
291, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Brandt v. Super. Ct., 693 P.2d 796, 800 (Cal. 1985). The
prevailing plaintiff may also recover prejudgment interest that accrues from the date when the
plaintiff first made a claim on the guarantee. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3287(b) (West 1991).
The right to recover attorney's fees may also be drafted into one of the agreements, as in
this financing agreement example, reprinted in KENOFF & ROSENBERG, supra note 32, Form
16-1, cl. 18: "In any action or proceeding between or among the parties hereto to interpret or
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C Arbitrate Any Guarantee Disputes
The parties should incorporate an "alternate dispute resolution"
clause into every agreement. Arbitration and mediation can often re-
establish strained business relationships without the cost, time and bitter
feelings that accompany ordinary litigation. Many contractual disputes
in Hollywood are resolved in this way by relevant trade guilds, collective
bargaining agreements, and arbitral tribunals.'
28
A standard arbitration clause appears in many entertainment con-
tracts129 and can be incorporated into guarantee agreements:
Should there be any dispute between the parties concerning the
interpretation of this Agreement or concerning an alleged
breach of this Agreement, which the parties are unable to re-
solve after consultation with each other, such dispute shall be
decided by arbitration pursuant to the regulations and proce-
dures of the American Arbitration Association. The parties
agree that any award rendered by the American Arbitration
Association may be entered in either the (name of state court)
or (name of federal court).130
In some circumstances, it is appropriate to request the guarantor
arbitrate disputes between independents and backers over the same pro-
ductions it guarantees. Most guarantors are well-informed about indus-
try politics and production techniques, and their existing ties to the
project will encourage them to reach a fair resolution so that production
can move forward quickly and economically.
D. Pick the Right Guarantor
Not all guarantors are created equal, and an independent has many
from which to choose when seeking a backer for production funding.
Some guarantors are well-established, high-volume businesses that offer
extensive services. Other guarantors are newly-formed spin-offs that of-
fer a more personal touch because of a smaller client base. The broad
range of services and premiums now available in the marketplace allows
an independent to choose a guarantor that fits its needs.
Many "older" guarantors do not like the competition. They cannot
rely solely on their connections and are forced to implement intensive
enforce any of the provisions hereof, the prevailing party shall, in addition to any other award
of damages or other remedy, be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs."
128. BIEDERMAN, supra note 18, at 283-84.
129. Chrystie, supra note 13, at 1.
130. KENOFF & ROSENBERG, supra note 32, Form 16-1, cl. 17(0.
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marketing and deal-making efforts just to maintain their existing market
share. Many guarantors are accepting projects they would have dis-
missed five years ago, just to keep their name listed in the trade papers.
Ms. Bette Smith of the Completion Bond Company is afraid that this
headlong rush may lead some of her colleagues toward disaster: "I don't
know if a lot of the completion guarantors who are entering the market-
place have the background that is necessary to properly analyze these
projects and to monitor them through completion. It's just a very risky
time in this market right now." 131
1. "One-Stop Financing"
Some guarantors have decided to garner business by offering an in-
dependent all the financial and technical needs, short of distribution, to
produce a film. An independent may have the guarantor broker all the
project's insurance, funding, crew, and equipment needs, in addition to
the guarantee. The boldness of this step cannot be over-emphasized;
these services were practically the majors' exclusive domain until now.
By using the guarantor-broker, an independent can circumvent the in-
dependent-major dilemma over who dictates creative control. On the
other hand, the guarantor has added incentive to supervise production
closely and evaluate how the independent uses its services. Has the in-
dependent really preserved creative license, or does the problem con-
tinue, with the majors having been replaced by the guarantor?
One of the first guarantors to sell package deals was the Completion
Bond Company, which created a "cut-rate production network" in 1986.
A typical package provides vans, generators, grip and electrical equip-
ment, laboratory processing, opticals, and titles. 132 Another one-stop fin-
ancier is Mr. Lawrence Vanger of Performance Guarantees, who
explains:
We are maintaining a level of profitability by offering additional
financial services which make it more attractive for the film-
maker to use us, rather than just looking simply at the price of
the completion guarantee. That includes banking advice, pro-
duction financing, distribution financing and expertise and
some overall elements which help the producer get his package
together; [we're] not simply interested in getting the cheapest
possible deal on one element. 33
131. Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
132. Completion Prod'n Package To Feature Ryder Services, DAILY VARIETY, May 14,
1986, at 4.
133. Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
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Apart from issues of who dictates creative control, a comparative
analysis of the costs and relative degree of supervision involved with one-
step financing may chill an independent's interest. Independents should
weigh the benefits and disadvantages of every package. Mr. Robert
Vince of the Motion Picture Bond Company, which guaranteed approxi-
mately eighty films worldwide in 1990, encourages independents to shop
the competition. 34 Like other guarantors, he simply dismisses the idea
of one-stop financing as "wishful thinking."'
' 35
To paraphrase Mr. Lionel Ephraim of Percenterprises, the question
of picking a guarantor is simply: Does the independent want a large
bonding company with considerable assets that supervises two or three
different productions each week, or a smaller company with fewer assets
and a more personal touch? 36 Because individual claims are usually in
the $1 million range rather than the $100,000 range, some independents
look more to a guarantor's assets while others seek hands-on
supervision. 
37
2. "One-Stop Insurance"
Some independents are attracted by a guarantor who joins forces
with an insurance company to sell a guarantee along with production
insurance. This activity now occurs both in the United States and inter-
nationally, and is a variation of one-stop financing which targets an in-
dependent's insurance needs. An independent should ask the same
questions about one-stop insurance as it would ask about one-stop
financing.
In the United States, independents can purchase production insur-
ance and a guarantee through International Film Guarantors. In 1990,
this company began a joint venture with Fireman's Fund and the Near
North Insurance Agency in Chicago, which provide the insurance.
31
Overseas, international ventures between Hollywood's guarantors
and foreign insurers make good business sense because many independ-
ents want to cultivate the twenty percent or more of their financing that
comes from foreign sources.' 39 In 1986, the Completion Bond Company
and Australia's Cine Bond Company (which is aligned with Cinesure,
Australia's leading film underwriter) struck a landmark international
134. Id
135. Id
136. Id
137. Id
138. Noglows, supra note 6, at 29.
139. Id
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deal. " They began to sell a mandatory combination guarantee/insur-
ance policy for Australian films budgeted over $700,000 Australian
(about $560,000 U.S., based on the average Australian-U.S. exchange
rate in 1991).
E. Closing Credits
It is appropriate to end this article by discussing the last thing most
moviegoers see - the closing credits. Even guarantors appreciate their
fifteen minutes of fame; increasingly, more guarantors want their name
listed in the closing credits. This area has become subject to intense ne-
gotiations between producers and guarantors.
Some recent hits featuring credited guarantors are Kevin Costner's
Oscar-winning Field of Dreams 4' and Dances with Wolves 14 2 (Comple-
tion Bond Company for both), and Honey, I Shrunk the Kids ' (Film
Finances). Other films listing guarantors are The Adventures of Baron
Munchausen '" (Film Finances), Winter People "' (Entertainment Com-
pletions), and L.A. Story '" (Complete Film Corporation).
CONCLUSION
Some independents treat guarantors as a necessary evil intrinsic in
the motion picture production process. On one hand, they are "neces-
sary" insofar as they are knowledgeable about the industry, expert in
negotiating deals and resolving problems, and financially indispensible if
production falters. They save pictures that might otherwise end up on
the cutting room floor. On the other hand, they can take ultimate crea-
tive control over independents, which cuts at the heart of the reason why
many producers make films.
An independent is justified in fearing a loss of creative identity to
this supervising guarantor. Nevertheless, blockbusters are still being
made. Films still gross millions of dollars. The independent market is
expanding, and more guarantors are entering into it. The success of
guarantors has not killed the independent market.
The key to resolving creative tensions lies in having the independent
incorporate the guarantor into the production game and learn how the
140. Noglows, supra note 39, at 4.
141. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal 1989).
142. DANCES WITH WOLVES (Orion 1990).
143. HONEY, I SHRUNK THE KIDS (Disney 1989).
144. THE ADVENTURES OF BARON MUNCHAUSEN (Columbia 1989).
145. WINTER PEOPLE (Columbia 1989).
146. L.A. STORY (Carolco 1991).
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guarantor can help achieve the mutually desired result - an efficiently
produced motion picture. Independents must continue to adjust their
visions according to financial restraints. Guarantors must continue to
anticipate and preempt problems. Until now, the prospect of an in-
dependent being fired has created tension and fear on many sets. In the
future, guarantors and independents should move beyond this tension
and create joint production companies that offer both creative and tech-
nical services for projects the majors choose not to make.
In the meantime, independents must work within the restraints im-
posed by guarantors. One bright light is that, by having guarantors su-
pervise the business aspect of production, the independent is left free to
be creative. The guarantor, however, still has the final word, as ex-
pressed by Mr. Richard Soames of Film Finances:
We do impose a discipline. We make contributions. We rely
on a relationship with the producer and director and depart-
ment heads. We keep in touch with the production on a daily
basis. We are advised of what was shot the day before, any-
thing that happened that was untoward. We are a shoulder to
cry on. And we go through all the legal documentation. And
if, in our opinion, the film is going over budget, we have the
right to step in.' 47
147. Loynd, supra note 8, at 116.
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